

## Small Capitalization Portfolio 4<sup>th</sup> Quarter, 2022

The Small Capitalization Portfolio Composite was up 11.14%, net of fees, for the quarter. This result was ahead of the Russell 2000 gain of 6.23%.<sup>1</sup> For the full-year, the Small Capitalization Portfolio Composite was down 11.55%, net of fees, compared to the loss in the Russell 2000 Index of 20.44%. The Portfolio Composite finished 2022 ahead of the Russell 2000 Index for the 1, 3, 5-year, and since-inception periods.<sup>2</sup>

Equity markets remained volatile during the 4<sup>th</sup> quarter. Our Technology and Energy positions performed well during the quarter. Notable underperformers included our Healthcare and Consumer Staples exposure. For the year, the value bias of the portfolio held up incrementally better than the overall small capitalization market, but 2022 was obviously a difficult year. As we explain below, we are trying to take advantage of the market weakness to cycle capital into new and existing positions that seem attractive.

### **The Portfolio<sup>3</sup>**

**Shoe Carnival (SCVL):** We purchased a new position in SCVL (and added to it in December); Shoe Carnival is a well-managed shoe retailer which targets middle-class consumers. Trading at just 5x earnings, the stock is anticipating an overall slowdown in consumer spending. We think SCVL can execute successfully in a slowing economy for several reasons. First, prior to the pandemic, the company brought in a new CEO who has improved store level profitability. Second, Shoe Carnival serves an economically-sensitive consumer and is likely to pick up slightly higher income families during an economic slowdown. Third, the company continues to expand its relationship with Nike; this “store within a store” has seen steady demand. Finally, the December 2021 acquisition of Shoe Station is another opportunity for growth. SCVL has a strong balance sheet, produces consistent free cash flow, buys back stock, and has increased its dividend every year for the past eight years.

**Thryv Holdings (THRY):** We added to our position in November. THRY continues to produce outsized profitability in its legacy yellowpages.com business and is producing double-digit growth in its small business software offering. The software business has reached breakeven in the United States faster than we expected. We believe the stock has been under pressure from a large shareholder liquidating his position and think this specific selling pressure should abate soon. Management has been buying stock in the open market, which is nice to see, and we continue to believe these shares are very attractive.

**Hain Celestial Group (HAIN):** We added to our position in HAIN in November. HAIN has been impacted by inflationary cost pressures, as well as a decline in its European alternative dairy business (HAIN is one of the largest producers of oat milk in the UK and continental Europe). We believe the

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<sup>1</sup>Past performance is no guarantee of future results, and no representation is made that results similar to those shown or discussed can be achieved. To receive a complete list and description of Investment Management of Virginia, LLC’s composites and/or a GIPS report that adheres to the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS), contact Investment Management of Virginia at (804) 643-1100.

<sup>2</sup>Portfolio inception is 1/1/94.

<sup>3</sup>The transactions/securities discussed in this section are generally portfolio-wide transactions for the accounts in this Portfolio and have not been selected by any performance criteria. It should not be assumed that all accounts in the Portfolio had the same transactions or that transactions in the future will be as profitable or will equal the performance of the securities mentioned.

company can ameliorate both of these issues, and we want to get exposure to possible economic improvement in Europe. HAIN has multiple high-quality brands, and we think the company is ultimately a takeout candidate.

Cross Country Healthcare (CCRN): We trimmed our position in October. CCRN continues to see strong demand for travel nurses, the company exceeded Street earnings expectations for the third quarter (again), and the stock had reached our maximum position size. We think the company will continue to see strong demand into 2023 and are maintaining a full position.

BelFuse (BELFB): We trimmed our position in November. BelFuse reported a strong third quarter, the stock reacted positively, and reached our maximum position size. We continue to like the company's long-term prospects, and BELFB remains a meaningful position.

Babcock & Wilcox (BW): We liquidated BW in November. BW cut its guidance for the year due to supply chain disruptions and operational missteps; this change came after the company had stressed the strength of the business model and operational consistency in the 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter conference call. Given that abrupt change and lack of visibility, we decided to move on.

## **The Equity Market**

What a difference a year makes! Last year at this time, the equity market was hitting all-time highs, large capitalization growth stocks still dominated the market, only a few (very smart) strategists were warning about high inflation, and the prospect of a brutal and protracted land war in Europe seemed absurd. Now, the Energy Sector is the market's darling, inflation and/or recession (a worrisome pair) are the topics du jour on financial news, and NATO is expanding its spending and membership in reaction to Russia's unimaginable aggression.

The current bearish case for the equity market requires, basically, a real recession with potential for substantial equity market losses in 2023. We must admit that some data support this view. A highly inverted yield curve (short-term interest rates are higher than long-term interest rates) is the most alarming harbinger of a recession. Tony Dwyer of Canaccord, whom we pay close attention to, points out that the current depth of inversion in the yield curve has preceded a recession 100% of the time. He cites several other quantitative indicators and sums up his argument by saying "it would be historically unique for the above indicators to hit their current levels and not go into a recession".<sup>4</sup> Mike Wilson of Morgan Stanley has been even more bearish; he believes that 2023 earnings may be much worse than currently anticipated because cost/expense inflation will outpace topline/revenue growth, causing profit margins to contract and 2023 earnings to disappoint. The relative performance of copper versus gold also supports the recession case; gold (a traditional safe-haven) is currently outperforming copper (an industrial metal that frequently reflects economic trends). Finally, some of the largest companies in the stock market (Apple, Alphabet, Amazon) are not producing the earnings growth we all have come to expect. If these market leaders continue to languish, it will be hard for the stock market to accelerate.

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<sup>4</sup> Tony Dwyer's morning note. Canaccord Genuity Capital Markets, Global Morning Summary, 12/15/2022.

The equity market bulls generally say that inflation has peaked and investors are too pessimistic about 2023. Jim Paulsen of the Leuthold Group, another strategist we like to listen to, is quite bullish. He believes the stock market will anticipate an economic recovery in late 2023 (higher price-to-earnings multiples can make up for lower earnings in the first half of 2023).<sup>5</sup> Tom Lee of Fundstrat also believes, like Paulsen, that equities can impress once inflation has peaked (which likely occurred this past Fall).<sup>6</sup> Jeremy Siegel, Professor at Wharton and author of *Stocks for the Long Run*, stated in a recent interview: “I have never seen so much bearishness in the market, which is a good sign for stock investors. I’ve never seen a recession so imminently called for. That is also good for investors”.<sup>7</sup>

We try to balance these risks and avoid making heavy bets based on the march of folly (economic predictions). We are worried about the ramifications of an inverted yield curve but are comforted by the pervasive bearishness and widespread discussion of recession (which is, by definition, somewhat priced into the equity market). The decimation of cryptocurrency and SPAC speculators and the stark slowdown in initial public offerings support our suspicion that a meaningful amount of risk has been wrung out of the market. In general, stock valuations do not look expensive to us. If there is a deep recession, it will likely be caused by something few people are talking about right now. We acknowledge this risk but believe the current odds for long-term investors look promising.

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<sup>5</sup> “Leuthold’s Paulsen Sees S&P 500 at 5,000 in New Bull Cycle”, Dec. 8, 2022, Bloomberg News.

<sup>6</sup> Tom Lee on CNBC Interview, Sept. 30, 2022.

<sup>7</sup> “The Excessive Bearishness is Great for Equity Investors”, Transcription of an interview at the Investment Insights Summit with Robert Huebscher, Dec. 13, 2022.

INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT OF VIRGINIA, LLC  
SMALL CAPITALIZATION PORTFOLIO COMPOSITE  
ACCOMPANYING NOTES

Year <sup>A</sup>	Total Return	Total Return	Benchmark	Benchmark		Composite	Composite Assets	Strategy Assets	Model Assets	Non-Fee Paying	Percentage of	Total Firm Assets	
	Gross	Net <sup>B</sup>	Russell 2000	Composite 3 Yr.	Russell 2000								Dispersion Gross <sup>C</sup>
	(Percent)	(Percent)	(Percent)	St. Dev. Gross <sup>C</sup>	3 Yr. St. Dev. <sup>C</sup>	Number of	(Millions)	(Millions)	(Millions)	Composite Assets	Non-Fee Paying	(Millions)	
				(Percent)	(Percent)	Accounts	(Percent)			End of Period (MM)	Composite Assets		
2012	24.37	23.70	16.35	19.84	20.20	22	0.55	15.46	58.06	73.37	2.77	17.94%	526.95
2013	36.11	35.24	38.82	15.86	16.45	53	0.80	29.85	139.01	184.94	2.26	7.56%	697.44
2014	-6.44	-7.10	4.89	11.98	13.12	50	0.68	27.70	106.25	162.01	2.40	8.65%	549.17
2015	-12.27	-12.88	-4.41	13.59	13.96	41	0.66	22.58	64.53	93.92	2.19	9.71%	437.32
2016	25.83	24.99	21.31	15.12	15.76	33	0.80	25.71	67.55	41.43	1.95	7.57%	484.18
2017	4.90	4.25	14.65	14.74	13.91	26	0.70	30.23	62.09	12.09	2.04	6.74%	491.22
2018	-8.56	-9.05	-11.01	17.31	15.79	25	0.46	24.91	54.44	7.73	1.68	6.75%	448.68
2019	15.33	14.74	25.53	19.16	15.71	19	0.76	24.57	58.41	9.01	1.54	6.25%	509.85
2020	34.32	33.61	19.96	24.59	25.27	17	0.65	31.64	72.28	0.80	1.97	6.22%	528.62
2021	23.85	23.24	14.82	21.44	23.35	14	0.58	32.10	85.37	0.00	2.39	7.45%	691.07
*2022	-11.11	-11.55	-20.44	22.12	26.02	11	0.76	27.21	38.31	0.00	1.84	6.74%	571.45

\* 2022 performance returns are for the period ending 12/31/22.

A. Inception of the composite was 1/1/94. Creation of the composite was 1/1/94.

B. Fee schedule: 1.00% per annum on the first \$1 million of assets; 0.75% per annum on assets greater than \$1 million. Fees are negotiable.

C. N/A for the current year signifies that the information is not available until year end. N/A for previous years signifies that the information was not required.

D. Supplemental information. In addition to composite assets, strategy assets include separately managed accounts that do not meet the criteria for inclusion in the composite and wrap accounts. Small Capitalization Portfolio model assets are managed by other firms based on model portfolios submitted by IMVA.

Investment Management of Virginia, LLC claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS standards. GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein. Investment Management of Virginia, LLC has been independently verified for the periods January 1, 1993 through September 30, 2022. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. The Small Capitalization Portfolio composite has had a performance examination for the periods January 1, 1994 through September 30, 2022. The verification and performance examination reports are available upon request.

#### 1. Basis of GIPS Report

Investment Management of Virginia, LLC ("IMVA") is a registered investment adviser under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940. IMVA was originally established as Scott & Stringfellow Capital Management, Inc., a division of Scott & Stringfellow, in 1982. In March 1999, Scott & Stringfellow became a wholly owned subsidiary of Branch Banking & Trust Company (BB&T). IMVA became an independent investment adviser in July of 2000 when the principals of Scott & Stringfellow Capital Management, Inc. purchased IMVA from BB&T. Total firm assets exclude model programs. Additionally, as supplemental information, as of December 31, 2022, the firm provides models to programs managing a total of approximately \$0.14 million in assets based on those models (this figure includes the Small Capitalization Portfolio model assets and all other model portfolio assets at IMVA).

#### 2. Composite Criteria

The Composite consists of institutional, endowment, retirement, and individual accounts. Tax-exempt and taxable accounts are included. The Composite seeks a strong total return through capital appreciation in small capitalization companies, including use of ETFs. The primary investment criteria are strong upside potential at a reasonable price. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Performance results of the Composite are based on U.S. dollar returns.

#### 3. Calculation Methodology

The Composite results are time-weighted rates of return net of commissions, custodial fees, and any other expenses incurred in the management of accounts. Accounts may be shown gross or net of withholding taxes on foreign dividends based on the custodian. These returns have been presented both gross and net of investment advisory fees. Quarterly composite rates of return, which are net of investment advisory fees, are calculated at the account level. Net performance returns have been calculated by reducing gross performance returns by the actual investment management fees charged. The three-year annualized standard deviation measures the variability of the composite and the benchmark returns over the preceding 36-month period. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset-weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. Policies for valuing investments, calculating performance, and preparing GIPS reports are available upon request.

#### 4. Comparison with Market Index

Results of the Composite are shown compared to the Russell 2000 Index. The Russell 2000 Index is comprised of the 2,000 smallest companies in the Russell 3000 Index, which measures the performance of the 3,000 largest publicly held companies incorporated in America, as defined by total market capitalization. The Russell 2000 represents approximately 1% of the Russell 3000 Index total market capitalization. For comparison purposes, the Russell 2000 is a fully invested index, which includes reinvestment of income, and the performance has been linked in the same manner as the Small Capitalization Portfolio Composite. The returns for this unmanaged index do not include any transaction costs, management fees, or other costs. The information contained in this material is based on data we have obtained from third party sources. While this information has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, we do not guarantee, nor are we responsible for, the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information provided in this GIPS report. The S&P 400 Index was used prior to 12/31/00 as a comparison index. It was replaced with the S&P 600 Index on 12/31/00 because this index was a more accurate representation of the market capitalization of the securities in the client accounts. The S&P 600 Index was dropped as an index as of 3/31/12 due to low usage of that index by institutional investors.

#### 5. SEC Advertising Disclosure Footnotes

All performance composite returns are reported net and gross of investment advisory fees charged by Investment Management of Virginia, and reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings. The investment returns will be reduced by commissions, custodial fees, and any other expenses incurred in the management of accounts. Accounts may be shown gross or net of withholding taxes on foreign dividends based on the custodian. Net performance reflects the deduction of actual quarterly fees for each account in the composite with the exception of one non-fee paying account in the composite for the periods prior to 9/30/2006. An implied 100 bps fee was applied to calculate net performance for the account. Gross of fees performance returns are presented before investment management fees.

#### 6. Additional Information

A GIPS report of any composite and/or a list of all composite descriptions is available upon request. Such inquiries should be addressed to George McVey, Investment Management of Virginia, LLC, 7231 Forest Avenue, Suite 204, Richmond, Virginia 23226, or contact him through email at gmcvey@imva.net.

**Past performance is no guarantee of future results, and no representation is made that results similar to those shown can be achieved. All portfolios have the potential of profit and/or loss on the investment securities.**